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Univocity
Use of a word/concept in its ordinary, everyday meaning.

Anthropomorphism
Literally, the view that God is/has a human-shaped body; by (analogical?)
extension, views that make God too human in other ways.

Question
Berkeley endorses univocity about religious language, which was traditionally
thought to lead to anthropomorphism. Is this charge justified in Berkeley’s case?
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Divine Simplicity
the true unity of God. . . makes no sense without the rejection of
anthropomorphism.
– Maimonides, Guide, ch. 1.1
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the true unity of God. . . makes no sense without the rejection of
anthropomorphism.
– Maimonides, Guide, ch. 1.1

Types of Complexity Denied
Mereological
Really (metaphysically) distinct attributes
Substance/attribute
Form/matter
Act/potency

Some Sources
ibn Sina, Metaphysica, chs. 21–26; Maimonides, Guide, chs. 1.35 and 1.50–52;
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Iq3.
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Problem One: Empiricism
Our words/concepts get their content from our experience of physical objects that
have all of these types of complexity. How can we then apply them to God?

Problem Two: Predication
Ordinary subject-predicate sentences like ‘Socrates is wise’ require a distinction
between the substance (Socrates) and the attribute (wisdom) possessed by it.

Problem Three: Non-Synonymy
‘Socrates is wise’ and ‘Socrates is snub-nosed’ differ in meaning because, and only
because, ‘wise’ and ‘snub-nosed’ denote different attributes possessed by Socrates.
If Socrates did not have a real plurality of attributes, we could not truly predicate
non-synonymous terms of him.
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If one believes [God] to be One and to possess a number of attributes, one in fact
says that He is One and thinks that He is many. This is the same as what the
Christians say: He is one but He is three, and the three are One.
– Guide, ch. 1.50
attributes. . . describing what a thing is. . . [are] inadmissible with reference to God,
because they all imply compositeness.
– Guide, ch. 1.52
the description of God by means of negative terms is the only sound description
which contains no element of loose terminology.
– Guide, ch. 1.58

Kenneth L. Pearce (Trinity College)

Does Berkeley Anthropomorphize God?

June 6, 2020

7 / 27

What Becomes of Theology?
There are no true affirmations about God, but theology (speech about God)
makes affirmations!

Kenneth L. Pearce (Trinity College)

Does Berkeley Anthropomorphize God?

June 6, 2020

8 / 27

What Becomes of Theology?
There are no true affirmations about God, but theology (speech about God)
makes affirmations!

First Strategy: Not About God
Whenever we apprehend one of God’s actions, we apply to God the attribute from
which the action proceeds. . . For instance, we apprehend the tenderness with
which He provides for the formation of the embryos of animals. . . Such action on
our part would presuppose affection and tender feeling. That is what we mean by
mercy, and we therefore use of God the term Merciful.
– Guide, ch. 1.54
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First Strategy: Not About God
Whenever we apprehend one of God’s actions, we apply to God the attribute from
which the action proceeds. . . For instance, we apprehend the tenderness with
which He provides for the formation of the embryos of animals. . . Such action on
our part would presuppose affection and tender feeling. That is what we mean by
mercy, and we therefore use of God the term Merciful.
– Guide, ch. 1.54

Second Strategy: Not An Affirmation
we. . . say that [God] lives, meaning that God is not subject to death. . . [we] say
that God is eternal, meaning that there is no cause which called Him into being.
– Guide, ch. 1.58
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we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not.
– Summa Theologiae, Iq3 preface
true affirmative propositions can be formed about God.
– Summa Theologiae, Iq13a12
[God] can be named by us. . . yet not so that the name which signifies Him
expresses the divine essence in itself.
– Summa Theologiae, Iq13a1
words are related to the things signified by means of the intellectual conception
[expressed by the word].
– Summa Theologiae, Iq13a1, translation modified
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rather than. . . express[ing] anything that exists positively in him. Hence they
assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an inanimate
thing. . . and this was taught by Rabbi Moses [Maimonides]. . . we must hold a
different doctrine—viz. that these names signify the divine substance. . . although
they fall short of a full representation of Him.
– Summa Theologiae, Iq13a2
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assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an inanimate
thing. . . and this was taught by Rabbi Moses [Maimonides]. . . we must hold a
different doctrine—viz. that these names signify the divine substance. . . although
they fall short of a full representation of Him.
– Summa Theologiae, Iq13a2
Corporeal parts are attributed [metaphorically] to God in Scripture, and this is
owing to a certain parallel. For instance, the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye
attributed to God signifies his power of seeing intellectually, not sensibly.
– Summa Theologiae, Iq3a1r3
some names. . . can be applied to God only in a metaphorical sense. Other names,
however, express [God’s] perfections absolutely. . . and such names can be literally
applied to God.
– Summa Theologiae, Iq13a3
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incomprehensible by human Understanding.
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it is in effect agreed on all hands, that the Nature of God, as it is in itself, is
incomprehensible by human Understanding.
– Sermon on Predestination, §3
observing great Order, Conveniency, and Harmony in all the several Parts of the
World. . . we are apt to consider, that we could not contrive and settle things in
so excellent and proper a manner without great Wisdom: and thence conclude,
that God who has thus concerted and settled Matters, must have Wisdom [and so
with the other attributes]. . . And it doth truly follow from hence, that God must
have these, or other Faculties and Powers equivalent to them, and adequate to
these mighty Effects which proceed from them.
– Sermon on Predestination, §4
we ascribe Foreknowledge to God, because we are certain he can’t be surpriz’d by
any Event, nor be at any loss what he is to do when it happens
– Sermon on Predestination, §18
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King uses both of Maimonides’ two strategies for reinterpreting theological
language.
King doesn’t pay much attention to the (alleged) distinction between
metaphor and analogy
King uses the similarity of effect strategy for the core divine attributes, and
not just for bodily metaphors.
The Guide had been translated into Latin by Johanne Buxtorfio in 1629, and
this Latin edition was quite common in Anglican libraries in the period,
including King’s own library at the time of his death.
Maimonides is cited (in Latin or Hebrew) by many early modern Christian
philosophers (e.g., Cudworth, Bayle, Locke, Leibniz, Wollaston).
But King disagrees with Maimonides in taking words like ‘wisdom’ to signify
some real “Faculties and Powers” in God.
In fact, it’s not perfectly clear that King even believes in (strong) divine
simplicity. His doctrine of analogy has other motivations.
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Summary of Classical Views

Because God is perfectly simple in the ways described, we can have no
concepts/ideas that properly express what God is like in Godself.
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Summary of Classical Views

Because God is perfectly simple in the ways described, we can have no
concepts/ideas that properly express what God is like in Godself.
Yet somehow we manage to think and speak of God.
To claim that our ordinary concepts/ideas apply to God in the ordinary way
(univocity) is to lapse into anthropomorphism—it’s not much different than
holding that God is literally a human-shaped body.
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Scotus’ Objection

I call a concept univocal if it is one in such a way that its unity is sufficient for a
contradiction to arise when it is affirmed and denied of the same thing. Its unity is
also sufficient for its use as a middle term in a syllogism so that we may conclude
without committing a fallacy of equivocation.
– On Being and Cognition, §26
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contradiction to arise when it is affirmed and denied of the same thing. Its unity is
also sufficient for its use as a middle term in a syllogism so that we may conclude
without committing a fallacy of equivocation.
– On Being and Cognition, §26
every inquiry about God assumes that the intellect has an identical, univocal
concept that it receives from creatures.
– On Being and Cognition, §39
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Clandestine Atheism
Atheists. . . have commonly had their Vizards and disguises. . . Atheists oftentimes
insinuate their Atheism even then, when they most of all profess themselves
Theists, by affirming that it is impossible to have any Idea or Conception at all of
God. . . and that no Knowledge or Understanding is to be attribute to him, which
is in effect to say, that there is no such thing [as God].
– Cudworth, True Intellectual System, 61
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God. . . and that no Knowledge or Understanding is to be attribute to him, which
is in effect to say, that there is no such thing [as God].
– Cudworth, True Intellectual System, 61
they. . . are strictly and properly called Theists, who affirm that a Perfectly
Conscious Understanding Being, or Mind, existing of it self from Eternity, was the
Cause of all other things; and they on the contrary who derive all things from
Senseless Matter, as the First Original, and deny that there is any Conscious
Understanding Being Self-Existent and Unmade, are those that are properly called
Atheists.
– Cudworth, True Intellectual System, 195
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they. . . are strictly and properly called Theists, who affirm that a Perfectly
Conscious Understanding Being, or Mind, existing of it self from Eternity, was the
Cause of all other things; and they on the contrary who derive all things from
Senseless Matter, as the First Original, and deny that there is any Conscious
Understanding Being Self-Existent and Unmade, are those that are properly called
Atheists.
– Cudworth, True Intellectual System, 195
The self-existent and original cause of all things must be an intelligent being. In
this proposition lies the main question between us and the atheists.
– Clarke, Demonstration, 38
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Berkeley’s Reaction to King

I met with some who supporting themselves on the authority of the Archbishop of
Dublin’s sermon concerning the prescience of God, denied there was any more
wisdom, goodness, or understanding in God than there were feet or hands, but
that all are to be taken in a figurative sense; whereupon I consulted the sermon
and to my surprise found his grace asserting that strange doctrine. It is true he
holds there is something in the divine nature analogous or equivalent to those
attributes. But upon such principles I must confess I do not see how it is possible
to demonstrate the being of God: there being no argument that I know of for his
existence, which does not prove him at the same time to be an understanding,
wise, and benevolent Being, in the strict, literal, and proper meaning of the words.
– Berkeley to Percival, 1 March 1709/1710 (Hight 36)
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Hylas’s Parity Argument

Hyl. Since therefore you have no idea of the mind of God, how can you conceive it
possible that things should exist in his mind? Or, if you can conceive the mind of
God without having an idea of it, why may not I be allowed to conceive the
existence of matter, notwithstanding I have no idea of it?
Phil. As to your first question, I own I have properly no idea of God or any other
spirit. . . I do nevertheless know that I, who am a spirit or thinking substance,
exist. . . Farther, I know what I mean by the terms ‘I’ and ‘myself’; and I know this
immediately, or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I perceive a triangle, a
colour, or a sound. . . taking the word ‘idea’ in a large sense, my soul may be said
to furnish me with an idea, that is, an image or likeness of God, though indeed
extremely inadequate. For all the notion I have of God is obtained by reflecting on
my own soul, heightening its powers, and removing its imperfections.
– Three Dialogues, 231
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Alciphron

In §§4.17–18, Lysicles presents Collins’ take on King on analogy.
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In §4.18, Euphranor (representing the early Berkeley?) says he’s never heard
this silly idea before.
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In §§4.17–18, Lysicles presents Collins’ take on King on analogy.
In §4.18, Euphranor (representing the early Berkeley?) says he’s never heard
this silly idea before.
In §4.19, Crito (representing the mature Berkeley?) reports that, after
hearing “a minute philosopher triumph upon this very point” he investigated
the extent to which King’s view is found “in the Fathers or Schoolmen.”
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In §4.19, Crito (representing the mature Berkeley?) reports that, after
hearing “a minute philosopher triumph upon this very point” he investigated
the extent to which King’s view is found “in the Fathers or Schoolmen.”
In §§4.19–21, Crito argues that sensible Christian thinkers like Aquinas,
Suarez, and Cajetan—and even crazy people like Pseudo-Dionysius and Pico
della Mirandola—thought predicates like knowledge were properly (i.e.,
literally) applicable to God. Unlike King (and Peter Browne) they did not
think analogy was a kind of non-literal speech.

Kenneth L. Pearce (Trinity College)

Does Berkeley Anthropomorphize God?

June 6, 2020

19 / 27

Alciphron

In §§4.17–18, Lysicles presents Collins’ take on King on analogy.
In §4.18, Euphranor (representing the early Berkeley?) says he’s never heard
this silly idea before.
In §4.19, Crito (representing the mature Berkeley?) reports that, after
hearing “a minute philosopher triumph upon this very point” he investigated
the extent to which King’s view is found “in the Fathers or Schoolmen.”
In §§4.19–21, Crito argues that sensible Christian thinkers like Aquinas,
Suarez, and Cajetan—and even crazy people like Pseudo-Dionysius and Pico
della Mirandola—thought predicates like knowledge were properly (i.e.,
literally) applicable to God. Unlike King (and Peter Browne) they did not
think analogy was a kind of non-literal speech.
Berkeley is right about this. See Fasko, “A Scotist Nonetheless?” (2018).
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Crito’s Conclusion

LYSICLES. . . . I am confident some author or other has maintained the
forementioned notion in the same sense as Diagoras [Collins] related it.
CRITO. That may be. But it never was a received notion, and never will, so long
as men believe a God: the same arguments that prove a first cause, proving an
intelligent cause; intelligent, I say, in the proper sense: wise and good in the true
and formal acceptation of the words. Otherwise it is evident, that every syllogism
brought to prove those attributes, or (which is the same thing) to prove the being
of a God, will be found to consist of four terms, and consequently can conclude
nothing. But for your part, Alciphron, you have been fully convinced, that God is
a thinking intelligent being in the same sense with other spirits, though not in the
same imperfect manner or degree.
– Alciphron, §4.22
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Analogy in Alciphron

Analogy is introduced by a freethinker mocking religion.
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Crito argues classical proponents of analogy saw it as a type of literal speech.
But Crito does not endorse analogy in any sense.
Contrary to previous interpreters, e.g., Daniel 2011, Curtin 2014, Pearce 2018
(!).

Kenneth L. Pearce (Trinity College)

Does Berkeley Anthropomorphize God?

June 6, 2020

21 / 27

Analogy in Alciphron

Analogy is introduced by a freethinker mocking religion.
Euphranor, who usually gives voice to Berkeley’s distinctive philosophical
views, has never heard of this idea.
In this particular instance Euphranor might represent 1709/1710 Berkeley.

Crito argues classical proponents of analogy saw it as a type of literal speech.
But Crito does not endorse analogy in any sense.
Contrary to previous interpreters, e.g., Daniel 2011, Curtin 2014, Pearce 2018
(!).

Further, Crito interprets the result of the divine language argument as
supporting univocity.
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The Attributes of Berkeleian Spirits

1

Classical Views on Divine Attributes
Motivations
Maimonides
Aquinas
William King
Some Critics

2

Berkeley’s Commitment to Univocity

3

The Attributes of Berkeleian Spirits
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Divine Simplicity Again

Types of Complexity Denied
Mereological
Really (metaphysically) distinct attributes
Substance/attribute
Form/matter
Act/potency
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The Simplicity of Berkeleian Spirits
Types of Complexity Denied
Mereological
Really (metaphysically) distinct attributes
Substance/attribute
Form/matter
Act/potency
A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being. As it perceives ideas, it is called the
‘understanding’, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called
the ‘will’.
– Principles, §27

Kenneth L. Pearce (Trinity College)

Does Berkeley Anthropomorphize God?

June 6, 2020

24 / 27

The Simplicity of Berkeleian Spirits
Types of Complexity Denied
Mereological
Really (metaphysically) distinct attributes
Substance/attribute
Form/matter
Act/potency
A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being. As it perceives ideas, it is called the
‘understanding’, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called
the ‘will’.
– Principles, §27

Kenneth L. Pearce (Trinity College)

Does Berkeley Anthropomorphize God?

June 6, 2020

24 / 27

The Simplicity of Berkeleian Spirits
Types of Complexity Denied
Mereological
Really (metaphysically) distinct attributes
Substance/attribute
Form/matter
Act/potency
A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being. As it perceives ideas, it is called the
‘understanding’, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called
the ‘will’.
– Principles, §27

Kenneth L. Pearce (Trinity College)

Does Berkeley Anthropomorphize God?

June 6, 2020

24 / 27

The Simplicity of Berkeleian Spirits
Types of Complexity Denied
Mereological
Really (metaphysically) distinct attributes
Substance/attribute
Form/matter
Act/potency
the very notion of what is called ‘matter’. . . involves a contradiction in it.
– Principles, §9
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The Simplicity of Berkeleian Spirits
Types of Complexity Denied
Mereological
Really (metaphysically) distinct attributes
Substance/attribute
Form/matter
Act/potency
701. the Substance of Spirit we do not know it not being knowable. it being purus
Actus.
828. The Will is purus actus or rather pure Spirit, not imaginable, not sensible, not
intelligible. in no wise the object of ye Understanding, no wise perceivable.
829. Substance of a Spirit is that it acts, causes, wills, operates, or if you please
(to avoid the quibble yt may be made on ye word it) to act, cause, will, operate &
it’s [sic] substance is not knowable not being an Idea.
– Notebooks
Kenneth L. Pearce (Trinity College)

Does Berkeley Anthropomorphize God?

June 6, 2020

24 / 27

The Simplicity of Berkeleian Spirits
Types of Complexity Denied
Mereological
Really (metaphysically) distinct attributes
Substance/attribute
Form/matter
Act/potency
701. the Substance of Spirit we do not know it not being knowable. it being purus
Actus.
828. The Will is purus actus or rather pure Spirit, not imaginable, not sensible, not
intelligible. in no wise the object of ye Understanding, no wise perceivable.
829. Substance of a Spirit is that it acts, causes, wills, operates, or if you please
(to avoid the quibble yt may be made on ye word it) to act, cause, will, operate &
it’s [sic] substance is not knowable not being an Idea.
– Notebooks
Kenneth L. Pearce (Trinity College)

Does Berkeley Anthropomorphize God?

June 6, 2020

24 / 27

The Simplicity of Berkeleian Spirits
Types of Complexity Denied
Mereological
Really (metaphysically) distinct attributes
Substance/attribute
Form/matter
Act/potency
701. the Substance of Spirit we do not know it not being knowable. it being purus
Actus.
828. The Will is purus actus or rather pure Spirit, not imaginable, not sensible, not
intelligible. in no wise the object of ye Understanding, no wise perceivable.
829. Substance of a Spirit is that it acts, causes, wills, operates, or if you please
(to avoid the quibble yt may be made on ye word it) to act, cause, will, operate &
it’s [sic] substance is not knowable not being an Idea.
– Notebooks
Kenneth L. Pearce (Trinity College)

Does Berkeley Anthropomorphize God?

June 6, 2020

24 / 27

The Simplicity of Berkeleian Spirits
Types of Complexity Denied
Mereological
Really (metaphysically) distinct attributes
Substance/attribute
Form/matter
Act/potency
Spirits and ideas are things so wholly different that, when we say ‘they exist’, ‘they
are known’, or the like, these words must not be thought to signify any thing
common to both natures.
– Principles, §142

Kenneth L. Pearce (Trinity College)

Does Berkeley Anthropomorphize God?

June 6, 2020

24 / 27
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Types of Complexity Denied
Mereological
Really (metaphysically) distinct attributes
Substance/attribute
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Act/potency
Spirits and ideas are things so wholly different that, when we say ‘they exist’, ‘they
are known’, or the like, these words must not be thought to signify any thing
common to both natures.
– Principles, §142
This is a denial of univocity!
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870. I must not give the Soul or Mind the Scholastique Name pure act, but rather
pure Spirit or active Being.
– Notebooks
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But what about the tulip passage? (Dialogues 195–197)
See Migely 2007; Daniel 2018.
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Thinking and Speaking of Spirits
it will be objected, that if there is no idea signified by the terms ‘soul’, ‘spirit’, and
‘substance’, they are wholly insignificant and have no meaning in them. I answer,
those words do mean or signify a real thing, which is neither an idea nor like an
idea, but that which perceives and wills and reasons about them. What I am my
self, that which I denote by the term ‘I’, is the same with what is meant by ‘soul’
or ‘spiritual substance’. . . as we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of other
spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be resemblances of them, so we
know other spirits by means of our own soul, which in that sense is the image or
idea of them, it having a like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by me
perceived has to those ideas perceive by another.
– Principles, §§139–140
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or ‘spiritual substance’. . . as we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of other
spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be resemblances of them, so we
know other spirits by means of our own soul, which in that sense is the image or
idea of them, it having a like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by me
perceived has to those ideas perceive by another.
– Principles, §§139–140
I have no idea of spirit but somehow manage to signify it. (Cf. Aquinas on God.)
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self, that which I denote by the term ‘I’, is the same with what is meant by ‘soul’
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How?
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those words do mean or signify a real thing, which is neither an idea nor like an
idea, but that which perceives and wills and reasons about them. What I am my
self, that which I denote by the term ‘I’, is the same with what is meant by ‘soul’
or ‘spiritual substance’. . . as we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of other
spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be resemblances of them, so we
know other spirits by means of our own soul, which in that sense is the image or
idea of them, it having a like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by me
perceived has to those ideas perceive by another.
– Principles, §§139–140

How?
By means of the resemblance of other spirits to myself. (Univocity)
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Berkeley’s Divinized Human Being
Berkeley accepts univocity between God and other spirits but denies univocity
between spirits (perceivers) and ideas (things perceived).
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between spirits (perceivers) and ideas (things perceived).
As in the most radical versions of the traditional doctrine of analogy, this
applies even to the word ‘exist’.
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The reason Berkeley gives for this denial of univocity is one of the traditional
reasons for denying univocity between God and creatures: spirit is actus
purus.
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Berkeley’s Divinized Human Being
Berkeley accepts univocity between God and other spirits but denies univocity
between spirits (perceivers) and ideas (things perceived).
As in the most radical versions of the traditional doctrine of analogy, this
applies even to the word ‘exist’.

The reason Berkeley gives for this denial of univocity is one of the traditional
reasons for denying univocity between God and creatures: spirit is actus
purus.
“Do but leave out the power of willing, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and
there remains nothing else wherein the idea can be like a spirit.” (Principles,
§137)
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between spirits (perceivers) and ideas (things perceived).
As in the most radical versions of the traditional doctrine of analogy, this
applies even to the word ‘exist’.

The reason Berkeley gives for this denial of univocity is one of the traditional
reasons for denying univocity between God and creatures: spirit is actus
purus.
“Do but leave out the power of willing, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and
there remains nothing else wherein the idea can be like a spirit.” (Principles,
§137)

Further, Berkeleian spirits are simple in all the same ways as the classical
God.
Berkeley is therefore not engaged in the kind of anthropomorphism criticized
by Maimonides and others. Berkeley sees a radical and unbridgeable gulf
differentiating God from the world.
Berkeley departs from the tradition in placing humans on the divine side of
that gulf.
Berkeley doesn’t have an anthropomorphic God—he has theomorphic humans!
Kenneth L. Pearce (Trinity College)
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